This paper studies financial integration in the presence of moral hazard, where banks may mitigate excessive risk by costly monitoring. We show that a drop in banks' cost of funds, less efficient intermediation technology, higher macroeconomic volatility, and a more generous deposit insurance raise the riskiness of projects in a competitive equilibrium. Overborrowing would arise even in the absence of deposit insurance in circumstances where the cost of risk monitoring is high, the banks' cost of funds is relatively low, and macroeconomic volatility is high. Reforming an inefficient banking system and improving its operation is a precondition for successful financial integration.
1.
Introduction and summary
The recent financial crises in emerging market economies have focused attention on the role of financial intermediation in explaining the costs and benefits of capital market integration. 1 Recent contributions stressed the tendency for overborrowing due to moral hazard considerations --a phenomena coined "the Overborrowing Syndrome" [see McKinnon and Pill (1996) , Dooley (2000) , Krugman (1998); and Brock (1992) for an earlier analysis of loan guarantees and overborrowing].
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These studies identified the deposit insurance system as the key mechanism leading to overborrowing.
Yet, several observers questioned the importance of deposit insurance in explaining the crisis in the Far East. For example, Radelet and Sachs (1998, page 24) argue that "It is hard to make the case, however, that foreign investors felt themselves in general way to be indemnified against risk through the prospect of generous bailouts...Thus, it is probably fairer to say that foreign investors thought too little about risk because they expected rapid growth and high profitability to continue, not because they expected a bailout." Our analysis will show that the Overborrowing hypothesis may be relevant even if the above statement is accurate. The implicit insurance argument may have weak explanatory power for overborrowing due to other considerations. Ex-ante; it is hard to measure the extent of implicit insurance. Ex-post, almost any realized path of borrowing can be 'explained' by the backward construction of expectations regarding implicit insurance. Thus, it remains a challenge to explain the dependence of overborrowing on the underlying economic structure --why does the Overborrowing Syndrome seem to matter for some countries, whereas other countries managed their borrowing more prudently.
Tracing the causes of overborrowing is pertinent to providing policy guidance. If the Overborrowing Syndrome is driven by the provision of implicit insurance, alleviating it requires dealing with the time inconsistency problems associated with public bailouts. One approach may be to design better precommitment mechanisms, in order to convince the private sector that the bailing out would not occur. This 'get tough' approach may include budgetary steps that will make bailing out prohibitive. If these policies are effective, one may argue that there is no further need to restrict financial intermediation. If the Overborrowing Syndrome were traced to inefficient financial intermediation, overborrowing may occur even in the absence of an implicit deposit insurance. In these circumstances one should design policies that improve risk monitoring, and would shift the financial intermediation from the less efficient towards the more efficient banks. As we will show in the paper, the root causes of overborrowing go beyond implicit insurance, as overborrowing may occur even in the absence of implicit deposit insurance. In these circumstances, prudent policies call for strengthening the efficiency of financial intermediation --penalizing borrowing if risk supervision is deficient, and encouraging financial intermediation by more efficient banks.
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In order to address these issues, one should derive the Overborrowing Syndrome endogenously, in a more fully specified economic model. The purpose of this paper is to construct such a model, and to argue that the welfare effects of financial integration are more involved than the ones suggested by the previous contributors. We show that the association between the depth of financial integration and welfare may be non-monotonic. We point out that overborrowing would arise even in the absence of deposit insurance in circumstances where the cost of risk monitoring is relatively high, the banks' cost of funds is relatively low, and macroeconomic volatility is high. Specifically, we propose a model where the riskiness of investment supported by banks is endogenously determined. Entrepreneurs rely on banks to finance investment, facing a trade off between risk and return. The limited liability associated with bank financing induces entrepreneurs to undertake excessive risk. We assume that banks may control this risk by costly monitoring, where greater risk reduction requires more resources devoted to project supervision. We characterize the competitive equilibrium, where banks' rents are dissipated, and the marginal project earns a zero rent. We show that a drop in banks' cost of funds increases the risk tolerated by banks. Similarly, a less efficient intermediation technology (i.e., a more costly risk monitoring), higher macroeconomic volatility, and a more generous deposit insurance, all raise the risk in a competitive equilibrium. Such an equilibrium tends to be inefficient --a combination of a low banks' cost of funds and a high enough cost of risk monitoring would imply a large distortion due to excessive risk taking.
We construct the social welfare function, being the sum of the expected surplus of all domestic agents. We use this welfare function to evaluate the consequences of financial integration for an economy characterized by a relative scarcity of savings. For a large enough cost of risk monitoring, the dependence of welfare on banks' cost of funds has an inverted U shape. A drop in the banks' cost of funds due to financial liberalization would have two effects -the direct saving in financing costs of a given investment is welfare improving, whereas the increase in the "excessive risk" distortion is welfare reducing. The "optimal depth" of financial liberalization is reached when these two effects balance at the margin. Any further welfare gain from financial liberalization would require improvement in the efficiency of financial intermediation. If the autarky banks' cost of funds is relatively large, it will curb the excessive risk distortion in autarky, implying that partial financial liberalization would increase -4 -welfare. For such an economy, full financial integration would be welfare reducing relative to partial financial liberalization, as it leads to excessive risk-taking. Similar to the case of immiserizing growth, it is the interaction between the initial distortion (excessive risk) and globalization of financial markets that leads to these second best results. 4 Even in these circumstances, the economy will benefit by financial integration that is accompanied by the proper improvements in the functioning of domestic banks.
Furthermore, our paper suggests that financial integration and reforming the banking sector are complementary policies, as the gain of each reform is magnified by the second.
Before turning to the model, it is constructive to put the paper in the broader context of the recent literature. Moral hazard was advanced as one of the possible causes of the crisis in the Far East in the late nineties [see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and the references there]. 5 These authors highlighted the implications of deposit insurance and other bailout schemes in inducing overborrowing. According to this interpretation, a crisis is triggered when a large enough overborrowing threatens the credibility of the bailout scheme due to fiscal constraints. Dooley (2000) and Chinn and Kletzer (1999) pointed out that, in the presence of government guarantees, financial liberalization puts in motion the process leading to overborrowing. These observations are consistent with recent empirical studies [see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) , and the review by Williamson and Mahar (1998) ].
The policy implications moral hazard induced by deposit insurance are studied in Hellmann, Murdock and Stigliz (2000) . In their paper, banks determine endogenously their risk exposure, and the prudential regulator learns the banks' riskiness only ex-post. The regulator's policies are the imposition of capital requirements and ceilings on deposit rate, and the ex-post closure of failed banks. They find that the optimal prudential regulations should include both capital requirements and ceilings on deposit rate. Our paper shares the concern of the above papers about overborrowing. It supplements these studies by
showing that overborrowing may exist even in the absence of deposit insurance, due to the banks' limited liability in circumstances where monitoring is costly. The implication of our study is that the bias towards overborrowing is even stronger than the one considered by the above literature, as it may happen even in the absence of bailouts. Hence, one should adopt a cautious attitude towards financial integration even in the absence of concerns about deposit insurance and bailouts.
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The model
All agents are risk neutral. Banks are competitive, and there is no reserve requirement. Each project costs H, and is characterized by a probability of failure m, and by a productivity index x. The productivity index is unobserved by banks, but is known to entrepreneurs. Henceforth we refer to m as measuring the project's riskiness, and we assume that the entrepreneur determines it ex-ante. Projects are independent, and are ordered by declining productivity --a higher x is associated with a lower productivity. Failure implies zero income, whereas success implies income e e x = ( ; ) m , where
Hence, riskier projects that turned out to be successful are associated with higher output. Entrepreneurs must finance the investment H by bank credit, at a real interest cost of r l . The expected gross income from project type x, denoted by p , is
The entrepreneur's net expected income, G, is 
Point B determines the optimal risk undertaking from the entrepreneurs point of view, whereas point D is the optimal risk undertaking if the project is self financed.
Banks may engage in costly risk monitoring. Specifically, spending z per project allows the bank to verify that the project's probability of failure is m . We assume that the monitoring cost increases
The bank's expected surplus with monitoring, per project, is
where r c is the bank's cost of funds. Henceforth, we assume a non prohibitive cost of monitoring --i.e., banks are better off monitoring. 6 , 7 Each bank controls a large number of independent projects, diversifying away the idiosyncratic risk. Competition among banks induces rent dissipation.
Proposition 2:
The interest rate and the projects' risk in a competitive equilibrium are characterized by
is the elasticity of supervision cost z with respect to the project's probability of success, 1 -m .
Proof -See Appendix A
The resultant equilibrium is characterized by Figure 2 , drawn for the case where H = 1. The bold curve is the bank's cost of a 1$ loan [i.e., z r c (˜) ( ) m + + 1 1]. The downward sloping line, cc, is the expected repayment per unit loan. Free entry and optimal monitoring implies an equilibrium at the tangency of the expected repayment line and the bank's unit cost line, determining m .
The productivity of the marginal project, denoted by x , is determined by the rent dissipation condition,
Applying (3) and (A2) to (7) we infer that
In a competitive equilibrium entrepreneurs will finance all the projects characterized by x x £ (recall that a higher x is associated with lower productivity). Equations (6a), (6b) and (7) form a system of 3 equations, the solution of which determines ( x r l ;˜; m ) as a function of the bank's cost of funds, r c .
Proposition 3: Less efficient financial intermediation or lower banks' cost of funds increase the projects' risk in a competitive equilibrium.
Example: Consider the case where monitoring technology and productivity are characterized by constant elasticities,
where h 0 , , f t and k are constants. In these circumstances (6) and (7) yield
Consumers
All agents are risk neutral, and their utility is
Some agents have access to an outside income in period 1, denoted by Y . These agents supply their saving, S, demanding real interest rate r c = r for S Y £ .
Welfare and financial integration
We consider now the implications of financial integration. We start the discussion with the characterization of the social welfare function, being the sum of the expected surplus of all domestic agents --producers, banks and savers. The welfare contribution of project x is obtained by summing (3) and (5), resulting in
We assume an internal solution in autarky, where the demand for investment is satisfied by the supply of saving at r c = r , and therefor savers' surplus is zero. We consider a continuous version of the model, where the 'number' of projects of productivity x is measured by f x ( ) [i.e., the mass of projects the productivity index of which is between x and x + e is f x ( )e ]. The social welfare function is the expected surplus aggregated across all the realized projects --
The social welfare for the constant elasticities example considered earlier, assuming a uniform
Financial integration allows domestic banks access to the global pool of savings, offering funds at a cost of r o . We assume that the autarky banks' cost of funds exceeds the global risk free interest rate [ r >
r o ]. Hence, financial integration is viewed as a process that reduces the banks' cost of funds to the global level. In these circumstances the patterns of risk undertaking and investment are summarized by (10), where the banks' cost of funds, r c , drops from r to r o .
The welfare contribution of domestic investment with financial integration is obtained by (13) = . With these assumptions the savers' surplus is zero, and (13) is the exact welfare function.
We can apply (13) to identify the socially optimal level of risk. This would correspond to an equilibrium where banks break even, investors finance all projects offering non-negative expected rents, and the riskiness is determined by a policy maker who maximizes (13).
Proposition 4:
The socially optimal risk (m S ) and investment ( x S ) for the constant elasticities example,
Proof -See Appendix A Note that the competitive equilibrium conditions (10) are a special case of (15), for W = 1.
Hence, the competitive equilibrium is associated with excessive risk if W > 1. This is likely to hold the higher the supervision cost k is relative to the start up cost H r c ( ) 1 + .
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The welfare effects of financial integration are found by evaluating the implications of a drop in banks' cost of funds. Applying (13) it follows that
In general, the effect of a drop in banks' cost of funds is ambiguous, as the sign of There are 2 useful benchmark cases where the "excessive risk" distortion is absent, and thus (16) is unambiguously negative. First, if all projects are self financed, ∂p m ∂m , and again (16) is negative. The excessive risk distortion is eliminated in these benchmark cases, either due to the "full liability" associated with self financing, or due to the optimal design of policies.
The dependence of welfare on the banks' cost of funds may be non-monotonic, characterized by an inverted U shape curve. This follows from Proposition 3 --recall that a drop in the banks' cost of funds and a less efficient intermediation technology increase the risk tolerated by banks. Hence, a combination of low banks' cost of funds and a high enough cost of risk monitoring would increase the distortion associated with excessive risk taking, and may induce dSW dr c > 0. In these economies, a drop in the bank's cost of funds would lead to a 'perverse' outcome, reducing welfare. The reverse applies if the banks' cost of funds increases. For a high enough banks' cost of funds, the excessive risk distortion would be small enough so that the sign of (16) is reversed -further increase in the banks' cost of funds reduces welfare [hence, (16) will become negative].
We confirm this intuition with the help of a simulation. 
------------------INSERT FIGURE 3 ------------------
Further insight is obtained by Figure 4 tracing the excessive risk distortion, measured by the gap between the socially optimal and the competitive risk levels [i.e., the gap between (15a) and (10a)].
Panel I of Figure 4 corresponds to relatively inefficient intermediation (using the parameter values associated with the bold curve in Figure 3 ). Panel II of Figure 4 corresponds to the case of relatively efficient intermediation (using the parameter values associated with the solid, top curve in Figure 3 ).
-11 -Curve CC traces the projects' risk in the competitive equilibrium, and curve OO corresponds to the projects' risk in the optimal allocation. As our previous discussion suggested, a combination of low banks' cost of funds and a high risk monitoring cost would lead to a large excessive risk. This situation is depicted by Figure 4 , Panel I, where the excessive risk is about 10% for low interest rates. In these circumstances higher banks' cost of funds increases welfare, as is depicted by the bold curve in Figure 3 .
A by product of the higher banks' cost of funds is that the "excessive risk" distortion shrinks gradually, implying that for a high enough banks' cost of funds the welfare effects of further increase in the banks' cost of funds are reversed. Conversely, in a relatively efficient system the gap between the optimal and the actual riskiness is relatively small, as is depicted by panel II in Figure 4 . In these circumstances financial integration is welfare enhancing, as is indicated by the top curve in Figure 3 .
------------------INSERT FIGURE 4 ------------------
Our analysis points out that an emerging market characterized by financial autarky and inefficient financial intermediation would benefit from the gradual relaxation of restrictions on capital mobility. An ideal transition should be characterized by sequential removal of capital controls, as part of a comprehensive program designed to improve the efficiency of financial intermediation. 10 In terms of Figure 3 , suppose that the emerging market is characterized by financial autarky, where the domestic real interest rate is higher than the global one, and the process of financial intermediation is relatively inefficient, so that the cost is k = 1.4k 0 . The optimal sequencing should target the removal of capital controls so that the domestic interest rate may follow overtime a path along line AB. This would correspond to an interest rate that, for the given efficiency of financial intermediation, maximizes the expected welfare. Political economy considerations may imply that existing banks would have the incentive to backtrack the process, in order to protect their quasi-rents. This suggests that it would be preferable to announce a pre-set path of removing capital control as part of a liberalization process that would lead to improvement in the efficiency of banks. This process would allow overtime access of domestic banks to foreign funds, as well as the operation of foreign banks in the domestic economy. 
Extensions -Macro shocks, deposit insurance
The model outlined above should be viewed as a benchmark framework, and one can extend it to reflect other concerns. In this section we review the impact of macro shocks and deposit insurance. We show that more generous deposit insurance and higher macroeconomic volatility magnify the "excessive risk" distortion. The presence of macro shocks and deposit insurance does not change the socially optimal risk, yet both would encourage banks to tolerate greater risk, increasing thereby the range where financial liberalization is welfare reducing.
Deposit insurance
We illustrate now the impact of changing the "generosity" of a deposit insurance scheme. For simplicity of exposition, we follow the assumptions of Section 2, where only idiosyncratic risk is present. Suppose that banks anticipate a partial bailout. Specifically, suppose that banks expect that, if their net income is negative, a fraction Y of the non-performing loans will be repaid by the public sector.
In these circumstances banks' expected profits (5) are modified to
If deposit insurance is expected to be used, the first order condition determining a project's risk is
Deposit insurance reduces the marginal cost of risk from the bank's point of view [the LHS of (18a)], encouraging thereby risk undertaking. While deposit insurance does not impact the expected output of a given project, it "socializes" part of the risk. Hence, banks would increase the project's risk tolerated. 12 The net effect is increasing the excessive risk distortion. This point is exemplified in Figure   5 , panel II, tracing the excessive risk as a function of the bank's cost of funds. The curve is drawn for the parameter values used in Figure 4 , panel I. The efficient risk is traced by curve OO. The top curve corresponds to a competitive equilibrium, where Y = 0 05 . , and the middle curve corresponds to the competitive equilibrium in the absence of deposit insurance ( Y = 0). As suggested by (18a), deposit insurance increases the risk tolerated by banks, magnifying the excessive risk distortion. Consequently, as in to the previous discussion, deposit insurance increases the range where financial liberalization would be welfare reducing.
------------------INSERT FIGURE 5 ------------------

Macro shocks
We preserve all the previous assumptions about the idiosyncratic characteristic, x, assuming a modified production function, where projects are also subject to macro shocks
and d is a macro shock, following a binomial distribution
each state may occur with probability 0.5. 13 Let us denote by R x ( , ) m the repayment on project type x, the risk of which is m . We assume that the realized output is public information. If the contractual repayment exceeds the realized output, the bank gets all output. 14 Hence, 
Unlike our pervious analysis, with macro shocks some producers would default partially, implying that the realized bank repayment will differ across producers. In the appendix we show that the equilibrium is characterized by
where E is the expectation operator. Condition (22a) states that banks break even ex-ante. Recall that the projects' productivity index is unobservable ex-ante, hence the banks' expected revenue is obtained by averaging it across all projects. Condition (22b) is the optimal risk monitoring, and condition (22c) is the brake-even condition for the marginal entrepreneur. The presence of the macro shock does not modify the expected output, and the social welfare function continues to be (13). Consequently, result (16) regarding the ambiguous welfare effects of a drop in the banks' cost of funds continues to hold. In Appendix A we show that, for constant elasticity, the uniform distribution example considered before, an extended version of Proposition 3 holds --Proposition 3': Higher volatility of the macro shock, less efficient risk monitoring or lower banks' cost of funds increase the projects' risk in a competitive equilibrium.
Proof --see Appendix A.
Macroeconomic volatility increases the distortion associated with excessive risk. Higher macroeconomic volatility induces more frequent partial defaults. This in turn leads banks to increase both the lending interest rate and the project's risk tolerated. The net effect is a rise in "excessive risk".
The economic rationale is that the repayment in bad states of nature is capped by partial default. Hence, banks will benefit by increasing the risk tolerated and the lending interest rate in the presence of a more volatile macro shock. The greater risk will increase the realized output in good states of nature, whereas the higher lending interest rate charged by banks will shift the repayment towards the good states of nature. This point is exemplified in Figure 5 , panel I, tracing the risk as a function of the bank's cost of funds. The curve is drawn for the parameter values used in Figure 4 , panel I. The efficient risk is traced by curve OO. The top 2 curves plot the competitive equilibrium for varying macroeconomic volatility.
The top curve corresponds to e = 0 25 . , and the middle curve corresponds to e = 0 (the absence of macroeconomic volatility).
Applying Proposition 3' to result (16) we conclude that, as in the previous discussion, for a high enough cost of risk monitoring, a low banks cost of funds, and significant enough macro volatility, a drop in the bank's cost of funds is welfare reducing. Macroeconomic volatility magnifies the excessive risk distortion, increasing thereby the range where financial liberalization would be welfare reducing.
Discussion and concluding remarks
Our paper considered the case where moral hazard can be controlled by costly risk monitoring undertaken by banks. While the details of the equilibrium in the credit market are model specific, the -15 -logic of the second best described in our paper should apply to other models as well -if the equilibrium is characterized by excessive risk, financial integration may magnify this distortion. This paper provides another example of immiserizing growth, this time due to "excessive risk" induced by the combination of low banks' cost of funds and costly financial integration. In these circumstances limited liability induces a distortion, leading frequently to overborrowing. In autarky, the damaging effect of the distortion is confined by the limited availability of domestic savings, which act both to restrict investment and to reduce the size of the distortion. Financial integration would magnify the cost of the "excessive risk" distortion, both by increasing the distortion and by increasing the volume of investment. The message of the model is that sequencing matters --efficient domestic banking is a pre condition for successful financial integration. 15 Our paper suggests that financial integration and reforming the banking sector are complementary policies, as the gain of each reform is magnified by the second. If one starts with a highly inefficient banking system, reforming it and improving its operation is a precondition for successful financial integration.
Appendix A
Appendix A summarizes the proofs of all the propositions in the paper.
Proposition 1
Proposition 1 follows immediately from (3) --the entrepreneur's optimal risk is determined by
Had the project been self financed, the entrepreneur's optimal risk would be determined by •
Proposition 2
Equation (6a) follows directly from maximizing the bank's expected income, (5), with respect to the project's risk, m . It equates the marginal benefit of risk reduction (the LHS of (6a)) with its marginal cost (the RHS of (6b)). Competition among banks induce rent dissipation. Hence, the borrowing interest rate is determined by
Equation (6b) is inferred by applying (6a) and (A2).
•
Proposition 3
Let the cost of banks' monitoring be kz(˜) m , k being a shift parameter measuring the efficiency of financial intermediation (i.e., the cost of risk monitoring). Equations (6a) and (A2) imply that 
In terms of Figure 2, , increases the projects' risk in a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 4
The socially optimal risk undertaking is determined by ∂ ∂m SW = 0, implying that
equation (15b) is obtained by solving (A5) for x . Recall that x is determined by the brake-even condition in the competitive allocation --all the projects offering non negative expected rents are financed. In these circumstances (A2) and (7) continue to hold, and consequently 
The scale of investment x is determined by the rent dissipation of the marginal producer, hence 
Combining (A6) and (A8) we get
The bank's break even condition implies 
This is the exact form of (22a). For the case of our constant elasticity example, we get 
Note that equation (6b) corresponds to (A13) for the case of zero macroeconomic volatility.
Proposition 3' follows from (A13).
Appendix B
The purpose of Appendix B is to characterize an equilibrium where banks have the incentive to monitor. This will be the case, if in a competitive equilibrium with no supervision, a bank that supervises would increase its expected profits. Note that, with free entry, a competitive equilibrium with no monitoring is characterized by ∂ p m ∂m 
Equation (B1) describes the entrepreneurs optimal risk undertaking (equation (4)). Equation (B2) . ; ; . ; ( )
H fx
The solid curve corresponds to k 0 = 0.34, the dotted curve to k = 1.2k 0 , the broken curve to k = 1.4k 0 , the bold curve to k = 1.6k 0 
H f x h k
Curve e = 0 corresponds to the competitive equilibrium, in the absence of macroeconomic volatility. Curve e = 0 25 . corresponds to the competitive equilibrium, for the case where e = 0 25 . . Curve OO traces the optimal riskiness of the marginal project in the efficient allocation.
